<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="/wp-content/themes/feed/atom.xsl"?>
<feed
        xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
        xmlns:wwe="http://release.wwe.com/atom/1.0"
        xmlns:thr="http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0"
        xmlns:taxo="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/taxonomy/"
        xml:lang="en-US"
        xml:base="https://www.drilaw.com/wp-atom.php"
	>
    <title type="text">Driscoll &amp; Driscoll, P.C.</title>
    <subtitle type="text">Driscoll &#38; Driscoll, P.C.</subtitle>

    <updated>2025-08-22T10:29:09Z</updated>

    <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.drilaw.com" />
    <id>https://www.drilaw.com/feed/atom/</id>
    <link rel="self" type="application/atom+xml" href="https://www.drilaw.com/feed/atom/?forceByPassCache=0.3628045037629958" />
	
	<generator uri="https://wordpress.org/" version="6.9.4">WordPress</generator>
<icon>/wp-content/uploads/sites/1502785/2022/03/cropped-DD_SITEICON_512x512_MAR22-32x32.jpg</icon>
        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Driscoll &amp; Driscoll, P.C.</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Massachusetts Appeals Court Clarifies Tenants’ Right to Raise Retaliation Defense in Evictions for Cause]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/08/massachusetts-appeals-court-clarifies-tenants-right-to-raise-retaliation-defense-in-evictions-for-cause/" />
            <id>https://www.drilaw.com/?p=252714</id>
            <updated>2025-08-22T10:29:09Z</updated>
            <published>2025-08-22T10:29:09Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[A recent decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court, Campbell v. Abdulla, 2024-P-0043, (appealing 22H77SP005330 in Northeast Housing Court) sheds light on an important area of landlord–tenant law: whether tenants can raise a defense of retaliation when facing eviction for cause, not just for nonpayment of rent. Background The tenant lived in her apartment for many years before reporting rodent issues…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/08/massachusetts-appeals-court-clarifies-tenants-right-to-raise-retaliation-defense-in-evictions-for-cause/"><![CDATA[<div>A recent decision from the Massachusetts Appeals Court, Campbell v. Abdulla, 2024-P-0043, (appealing 22H77SP005330 in Northeast Housing Court) sheds light on an important area of landlord–tenant law: whether tenants can raise a defense of retaliation when facing eviction for cause, not just for nonpayment of rent.</div>
<div></div>
<h2>Background</h2>
<div>The tenant lived in her apartment for many years before reporting rodent issues and other housing code violations to her landlord and to the Haverhill Board of Health. The board then issued a notice of violation against the landlord. Approximately one month later, the landlord served the tenant with a "for cause" notice to quit.</div>
<div></div>
<div>At trial, the Housing Court judge acknowledged that the tenants had a “facially viable” retaliation defense under Massachusetts law. However, the judge ruled that retaliation defenses only applied to nonpayment cases or no-fault terminations — not to for-cause evictions. The landlord won possession.</div>
<div></div>
<h2>The Appeals Court’s Ruling</h2>
<div>The Appeals Court disagreed with the Housing Court judge. It held that retaliation defenses under G.L. c. 239, § 2A and G.L. c. 186, § 18 are not limited to nonpayment or no-fault cases. Instead, they apply broadly to summary process actions, including "for cause” evictions.</div>
<div></div>
<div>Because the landlord’s notice to quit came just weeks after the tenant’s health code complaint, a legal presumption of retaliation arose (which occurs if a notice to quit is sent within six (6) months of a complaint). That meant the burden shifted to the landlord to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that the eviction was based on independent reasons and not on retaliation.</div>
<div></div>
<h2>Why This Matters for Landlords</h2>
<div>Timing is critical: Serving a notice to quit soon after a tenant reports code violations can create legal risks.</div>
<div></div>
<div>Higher burden of proof: Once retaliation is presumed, landlords must demonstrate that they would have proceeded with eviction regardless of the tenant’s protected actions.</div>
<div></div>
<div>Careful documentation is key: Landlords should keep detailed records of tenant lease violations and communications to show legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for any termination.</div>
<div></div>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<div>The Appeals Court’s decision reaffirms Massachusetts’ strong public policy against retaliatory evictions. Landlords should understand that retaliation defenses extend beyond nonpayment cases, and that courts will closely examine the timing and circumstances surrounding any summary process action.</div>
<div></div>]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Driscoll &amp; Driscoll, P.C.</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Understanding the Important of the Implied Covenant of “Quiet Enjoyment”]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/08/understanding-the-important-of-the-implied-covenant-of-quiet-enjoyment/" />
            <id>https://www.drilaw.com/?p=252712</id>
            <updated>2025-08-13T19:51:32Z</updated>
            <published>2025-08-13T19:51:32Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[Many landlords are surprised to learn that even though they own a property, and even though their lease contains no express covenants of quiet enjoyment, they cannot enter into their tenant’s apartment whenever they want, even if the tenant is allegedly violating their lease. Entering without proper notice, or outside of very specific circumstances, can lead to legal claims from…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/08/understanding-the-important-of-the-implied-covenant-of-quiet-enjoyment/"><![CDATA[Many landlords are surprised to learn that even though they own a property, and even though their lease contains no express covenants of quiet enjoyment, they cannot enter into their tenant’s apartment whenever they want, even if the tenant is allegedly violating their lease. Entering without proper notice, or outside of very specific circumstances, can lead to legal claims from a tenant for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.

Massachusetts Courts and M.G.L. c. 186, § 14 state that tenants are entitled to “quiet enjoyment” of their rented property; they are guaranteed the right to be free from ‘serious’ interferences with their tenancies. Doe v. New Bedford Housing Auth., 417 Mass. 273, 285 (1994).

‘Implied covenant’, means that this right is implicit in every contract to lease, whether or not it is expressly written. Not only that, but it is a right that cannot be invalidated regardless of the lease language. A claim for breach of quiet enjoyment can be brought by a tenant against a landlord for civil damages as well as a defense in a claim by a landlord against tenant.

The most common circumstances in which a landlord may enter into a tenant’s property are:
<ol>
 	<li>To make necessary and/or agreed repairs;</li>
 	<li>To show the property to prospective tenants, buyers, or other interested parties;</li>
 	<li>To inspect the premises (i.e. as condition of the lease, to determine if the premises are abandoned)</li>
 	<li>If there is an ongoing emergency that requires attention (i.e. fire, flood, gas leak)</li>
</ol>
The only time in which a landlord should enter a tenant’s apartment without proper and prior notice is under 4 above, in case of an emergency. Otherwise the landlord must provide notice to the tenant that they are entering the property. Unless the lease says otherwise, the notice should preferably be in writing, either through email, letter, text, or whichever medium which you are most likely to be noticed. Unless the lease says otherwise, twenty-four (24) hours is generally acceptable, though forty-eight (48) hours is less intrusive and therefore safer for the landlord.

Do NOT: avoid entering into a unit that needs repairs for fear of violating this covenant. A landlord violates M.G.L. c. 186, § 14, when its acts or omissions impair the value of the leased premises. Jablonski v. Clemons, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 (2004).

Do NOT: Enter into tenant’s apartment without prior notice because you are frustrated by tenant not paying rent, especially if the tenant turns out to only be wearing underclothes. You may be compelled to pay three months’ rent in damages. Jeffrey Ginsberg v. Edward Riggio et al, No. 24H79SP003050, Housing Ct. (Feb. 5, 2025).

Do NOT: send contractors into a tenant’s unit without prior notice. Even though it’s technically not the landlord entering the unit, it can have a similar effect of interfering with quiet enjoyment.

Do NOT: turn off any utilities because of alleged lease violations on behalf of the tenant.

DO: notify the tenant, through a medium you have communicated before and at least twenty-four hours in advance, that someone will enter the unit to perform maintenance work.

DO: in the event of an emergency, attempt to contact the tenant by a more immediate medium like phone or text to coordinate an appropriate response. Even if you are planning on entering the unit in response to an emergency, notify the tenant if they are not present.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	        <entry>
            <author>
									                    <name>On Behalf of Driscoll &amp; Driscoll, P.C.</name>
				            </author>
            <title type="html"><![CDATA[Taking Lessons From A Recent Decision Involving Allegations Of Conditions Issues]]></title>
            <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/04/taking-lessons-from-a-recent-decision-involving-allegations-of-conditions-issues/" />
            <id>https://www.drilaw.com/?p=252675</id>
            <updated>2025-04-08T07:18:44Z</updated>
            <published>2025-04-08T07:18:44Z</published>
					<taxo:topics><![CDATA[-]]></taxo:topics>
            <summary type="html"><![CDATA[The most common type of summary process case, by far, is based on a notice to quit for ‘nonpayment’. This is true for our office as well for the Commonwealth and United States at large. In response to a nonpayment case in the Commonwealth, a defendant tenant will frequently submit a defense or counterclaim citing G.L. c. 239 § 8A,…]]></summary>
			                <content type="html" xml:base="https://www.drilaw.com/blog/2025/04/taking-lessons-from-a-recent-decision-involving-allegations-of-conditions-issues/"><![CDATA[The most common type of summary process case, by far, is based on a notice to quit for ‘nonpayment’. This is true for our office as well for the Commonwealth and United States at large.

In response to a nonpayment case in the Commonwealth, a defendant tenant will frequently submit a defense or counterclaim citing G.L. c. 239 § 8A, which provides protection against a landlord’s breach of warranty, any provision of the rental agreement, or any other law.

A defense or counterclaim successfully argued under this rule can have serious consequences: reducing the amount owed by a tenant or even resulting in the landlord owing money to the tenant. What perhaps isn’t as widely understood is that G.L. c. 239 § 8A can also be used as a potential defense to possession.

In the 2020 case of <u>Ferreira v. Charland</u>, the landlord brought a summary process seeking possession against a residential tenant. The tenant raised a defense under G.L. c. 239 § 8A alleging the landlord violated a water use statute under G.L. c. 186 § 22. Rather than litigate the tenant’s allegations under G.L. c. 186 § 22, or possibly enter some type of agreement through the court, the landlord gave the tenant two checks: one representing double the amount the tenant paid for water costs and another which was to pay for any potential water and sewer damages. The amount paid supposedly represented three months’ rent.

Prior to trial, the landlord argued that the two checks acted as a legal “cure”, dissolving the tenant’s defense. The Judge agreed and awarded possession to the landlord. The tenant appealed, arguing that two payments did not preclude an argument for possession under G.L. c. 239 § 8A.

In 2023, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the Housing Court finding among other things that, “a landlord’s tender of money damages to the tenant, after the landlord commenced summary process proceedings, does not moot the tenant’s claim to possession, unless the tenant has clearly released the claim, because money damages are but one of two available remedies – the other being the tenant’s ability to remain in the property (possession) upon proof of a valid counterclaim or defense under § 8A.” As a result, the Appeals Court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the Housing Court.

The Appeals Court even made note of the landlord’s good faith in making the payments, stating that, “To be clear, we are not suggesting that the landlord here acted with bad intent, as opposed to making (and then trying to cure) an honest mistake. But § 8A’s mandate applies to all landlords, including those less scrupulous than the landlord here appears to have been.”

Outside of the ruling from <u>Ferreira</u>, the case has another clear lesson: make any agreement as direct and encompassing as possible. If a landlord is offering monetary compensation to a tenant to resolve part or all of their dispute, make sure that there is a written agreement signed by all parties that includes exactly what will be offered and accepted as consideration.

The landlord in <u>Ferreira</u> believed that by paying the tenant, they had no further defense under G.L. c. 239 § 8A. Had the parties entered into an agreement with those terms expressly stated, the landlord would have been correct.]]></content>
						        </entry>
	</feed>